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Abstract:  
We examine the effects of famine relief efforts (food aid) in regions undergoing civil war. 
In our model, warlords seize a fraction of all aid and use it to feed soldiers. They hire 
their troops within a population of farmers heterogeneous in skills. We determine the 
equilibrium distribution of labor in this environment and study how the existence and 
allocation strategies of a benevolent food aid agency affect this equilibrium. Our model 
allows us to precisely predict who will fight and who will work in every circumstance. 
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1 Introduction
Humanitarian aid agencies might be better prepared to deal with famines if
they knew in advance which sectors of a population would be most affected.
Part of the answer, we find, has to do with how the agencies themselves do
things.
The arrival of food aid into a region tends to benefit more than just the
hungry. Aid agencies hire local personnel, buy local goods, pay bribes, make
deals, and are robbed. Much of this appropriation is organized by or trickles
up to a regional potentate or warlord. Regions may already be at war with one
another, but the onset of famine brings a new dimension of conflict: regions
compete for food aid. And the best way to attract food aid is to have hungry
people.
Therefore we would expect warlords to manipulate the food needs of the
population within their control in an effort to enrich themselves or finance
their operations — essentially, to use hunger as a weapon.
This paper presents a formal, game theoretic model which illustrates how
warlords may include the availability of food aid in their strategic decision-
making. We take as our starting point a country divided into two regions, each
controlled by a warlord. Individuals within an area have different agricultural
productivities, or at any rate different access to food. Many do not have enough
to survive on their own. Warlords are engaged in appropriative conflict with
each other: each warlord hires soldiers in order to fight over a prize. Soldiers
earn enough not to starve. As warlords are the only employers in a region,
their hiring practices largely determine who in the region will need food aid,
and how much each person will need. In our model they take this fully into
consideration when recruiting.
This view of things seems to tally with observations which people in the
field have made over the years. Cuny1 and Hill (1999) say, “Combatants always
receive priority for food — those with guns rarely starve. (. . . ) People who
produce food are the ones most likely to starve.” Weiss and Collins (2000)
summarize the links between aid, agencies, and warlords as follows:
Combatants steal or extort relief assets (. . . ) In addition to humani-
tarian goods, combatants may receive cash for providing protection to
relief workers or relief warehouses and for allowing access to certain
roads, airfields, or ports. Combatants may also intentionally create
1Frederick C. Cuny was a civil engineer and disaster relief specialist. He did field work
in such places as Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia and Sri Lanka, while they were undergoing civil
conflict. He disappeared in Chechnya in 1995.
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noncombatant displacement and acute impoverishment in order to lure
relief agencies and their assets to a conflict environment, as was the case
with Liberian warlords. Relief agencies have often implicitly or explic-
itly cut deals and accepted that a portion of their relief assets will be
diverted to combatants — a kind of “tax” or “cost of doing business” in
war zones. (pp. 133-134)
In Africa, the power structure seems to change constantly. More and more
governments lose their hold on their countries, which break up unofficially into
smaller territories ruled by ambitious potentates. One journalist (Polgreen,
2006) speaks of
(. . . ) the drawn-out ending of one era — the slow demise of nationalist
Big Man politics — and the beginning of another, in which warlords pre-
siding over small, nonideological insurgencies played havoc across much
of the region, enriching themselves and laying waste to their homelands.
1.1 Related Literature
Who takes part of conflict? Who fights? are questions that have been asked
by researchers in many fields. The literature can be divided in two broad parts
according to the way it approaches answers to these questions. First, an impor-
tant literature tries to establish the circumstances that favor an individual’s
participation in conflict. We should of course distinguish voluntary participa-
tion from conscription, although one could argue that conscription is easier
to sustain if it somehow meets the will of conscripts. Where participation is
voluntary, many motivations have been proposed. From frustration, economic,
ethnic or other, to ideology (which, by most definitions, has a component of
reality denial), the literature has covered a large spectrum of possible circum-
stances (see, e.g. Horowitz, 1985; Muller and Seligson, 1987). As Humphreys
and Weinstein (2008) demonstrate, no single one, however, can speak for all
conflicts.
While this literature tends to focus on the motivations for conflict, an-
other views the cause of conflict in opportunities (Goodwin and Skocpol, 1989;
Lohmann, 1993; Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). In this
equally important literature, little place is left for spontaneous outspurs of
violence or reality denials and ideologically driven actions. Here, individuals
act rationally. They ponder their choices. Even though ideology can be ra-
tionalized (see, e.g. Bénabou, 2008), conflict is analyzed through the lenses
of researchers in this strand of thought as the collective result of individually
rational agents comparing all opportunities.
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In the latter approach to circumscribe the triggering elements of individ-
uals’ participation in conflict, a series of theoretical articles have established
substantial ground. Herschel Grossman (1991), for example, views insurrec-
tions as a business like any other. In his models, armies and milicias are made
of individuals allocating economic time to soldiering. When choosing whether
to take part of fight, these individuals weigh the pros and cons of their enrol-
ment, and in particular, they understand the opportunity cost of their action.
In such a theory of conflict, ideologies play little role. Soldiers are pure mer-
cenaries. In Azam (2006), participants internalize the cost the conflict might
have on them if they do not participate: the opportunity cost of not par-
ticipating includes possible victimization of civilians by warlords. The latter
of course anticipate this and make sure the cost is credible, by encouraging
looting and violence against civilians, including their own. In Gates (2002),
recruits enter a self enforcing contract with the landlord or the rebel leader.
Their relationship is one of a principal and multiple agents and everyone’s
action is individually rational. Gates (2002) brings interesting light at the
sustainability of militia groups. Recently, Esteban and Ray (2008) propose a
theory of ethnic conflicts in which individuals participate because they benefit
from the fight.
In this vein of research, another important question is why wars would
erupt in the first place, in other words why warlords would choose conflict
over settlement. Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) provide an excellent review
of this literature. Conflict can be rationalized by information asymmetries: it
may serve as a way for one party to (costly) signal its strength or equivalently
to force another to reveal a private information and prevent its bluff (Brito and
Intriligator, 1985). Wars can also arise in absence of informational problems.
In spite of their cost, they can be worthwhile today if they provide one party
with a permanent advantage over another (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000)
or because one party may prefer fighting for a pie that cannot be divided or
for the lack of commitment possibilities in settlements (Fearon, 1995; Powell,
2006). Territories are often considered as indivisible in bargaining, although
the indivisibility may be endogenous (Goddard, 2006).
In this paper, we present a general equilibrium model of a heterogeneous
population at the brink of war and threatened by a famine. Two warlords
prepare to wage war against each other. Their conflict is purely appropria-
tive and cannot be resolved through bargaining because of their inability to
commit to a settlement. In this environment, we identify the equilibrium dis-
tribution of soldiers and farmers and show the particular and non-trivial role
humanitarian aid agencies can play in shaping the equilibrium distribution of
agents across occupations. Importantly, we are able to predict who within the
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civilian population will fight, who will produce goods, who will starve, and
among the latter who may be saved by humanitarian aid.
Clearly, this paper is also directly related to the literature on humanitar-
ian aid. As is now well understood, all attempts at providing some form of
protection against shocks are tainted in some way by the so-called Samaritan’s
dilemma (Buchanan, 1975; Pedersen, 2001). The benevolent aid provider un-
willingly generates a demand for aid. Potential recipients tend to create the
conditions that will grant them access to aid. Blouin and Pallage (2009) have
shown that humanitarian aid agencies are by nature particularly vulnerable to
this form of moral hazard. Although the Samaritan’s dilemma, in the context
of humanitarian aid, is significantly more difficult to solve than in typical aid
relationships, the authors propose a self-enforcing contract that does address
the problem. In a different paper, Blouin and Pallage (2008) show that hu-
manitarian aid agencies are not deprived of means to influence conflicts on
the ground: they can use warlords’ greed to influence warfare by designing
conditional aid delivery schedules. In the present paper, we put the spotlight
on the micro-foundations of an equilibrium involving two belligerants, their
respective population and an aid agency. As in Blouin and Pallage (2008,
2009), the role of the aid agency is far from neutral.
2 The Model
There are 2 areas (but our results can be generalized to N areas). Areas
receive aid, they wage war on one another, but otherwise they are closed
economies. They do not trade with each other or with the outside world.
There is no migration from one area to the other. Each area has one warlord
and a population of measure 1. A single humanitarian aid agency provides aid
to both areas.
We shall assume that the areas are identical. This is not essential for our
results, but does facilitate exposition a great deal.
Food is the only good in the economy. Individuals may harvest it, receive it
as aid, or receive it as wages for soldiering. Each individual needs to consume
a minimum quantity c of food to survive. Warlords are not subject to this
requirement.
Briefly, the main events modeled in this paper are the following. Warlords
recruit soldiers within their areas, then engage in appropriative conflict against
one another. Many non-combatants are threatened with famine, and the aid
agency tries to save as many of these as possible. Warlords loot a fraction of
all incoming aid. We will elaborate on these actions later.
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Our main objective is to determine which individuals in each area will be
recruited, which ones will receive aid, and which ones will be victims of famine.
We do not include war deaths in our model, only deaths from starvation. We
do this in order better to focus on the subject at hand, the distribution of food
resources during civil war.
2.1 The population
Each individual will become either a soldier or a farmer. If the warlord in his
area offers him a wage which he finds suitable, he becomes a soldier. Otherwise
he becomes a farmer. Farming here is used as a proxy for whatever way people
acquire food under normal circumstances, i.e. without the intervention of a
warlord or an aid agency. It can be any non-military occupation. Thus we
need not necessarily think of these economies as agrarian.
People’s productivities as farmers differ. Within each area an index i ranks
individuals according to their farming productivity, from 0 (least productive)
to 1 (most productive). In this sense we will say that the population is uni-
formly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. A harvest function h(i) measures the
actual amount of food an individual with index i can produce on his own as a
farmer. This is an increasing function, with
h(0) < c < h(1) . (1)
That is, the least productive cannot produce enough to survive, while the most
productive can. See Figure 1, which is drawn for a single area and a linear
harvest function. We denote i∗ the index number of the individual who can
just produce enough to survive. Thus individuals in the interval [0, i∗) cannot
survive on their own; those in the interval [i∗, 1] can. We call the former “poor”
and the latter “rich.” These are of course only relative terms.
For a poor individual, there are only two ways to escape starvation. The
first is to be recruited as a soldier by the area’s warlord. In that case, the
individual does not produce h(i); he must receive a wage of c or more to
survive. The other is to be a farmer, produce h(i) on his own, and receive
c− h(i) as aid.
In contrast to farming, soldiering is an occupation where all individuals are
equally productive, provided they receive enough food (as wages) to survive.
Specifically, we will say that any soldier who receives less than c is completely
useless militarily; but all soldiers who receive c or more are equally effective.
Thus our main assumption regarding people is that they differ widely in
their ability to produce food for themselves, but do not differ in their ability
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Figure 1. Individuals within an area are uniformly distributed
over the interval [0, 1]. Their ability to provide for themselves is
given by the harvest function h(i).
to fight. After all, with a modern firearm in his hands, almost anyone can be
a soldier; this is demonstrated by the all-too-common practice, in Africa and
elsewhere, of recruiting children as militia.
2.2 Timing and objectives
The game unfolds in three stages, as follows:
1. warlords recruit soldiers; all those not recruited become farmers;
2. soldiers fight; farmers harvest;
3. the aid agency delivers food aid to people who need it; a fraction of this
aid is seized by warlords.
2.2.1 Recruiting
In the first stage of the game, warlords recruit soldiers from the population
and pay them wages. These wages can vary from one soldier to another.
As previously mentioned, every soldier must be paid at least c, otherwise
he will be ineffective. But there is also the individual’s opportunity cost to
consider: in order to induce an individual to become a soldier, a warlord must
pay that individual at least what he could obtain by remaining a farmer, his
harvest amount h(i). The warlord will pay just enough to meet these two
conditions; consequently a soldier’s wage will be the survival amount or the
harvest amount, whichever is more:
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w(i) = max{c, h(i)} . (2)
In equilibrium any individual of type i will accept to become a soldier if he
is offered w(i).2 That being the case, we do not need to model individuals’
behavior any further; we will focus on the decisions of warlords and the aid
agency.
We wish to make two additional points about recruiting. First, we model
soldiering as a voluntary occupation: there is no conscription. In reality con-
scription may very well occur; but in that case it is still more difficult to
conscript someone against his will (someone whose prospects as a civilian are
high) than someone who has relatively little to lose by joining the militia.
Even this is sufficient to justify our approach.
The second point is that the wage set out in equation (2) does not take
into account any risks incurred by soldiers. In other words, it is not necessary
to pay soldiers more than their harvest amount h(i) on the grounds that they
face a risk of death. The reason is that in most modern civil wars, civilians
are as much in danger as soldiers [see Azam (2002) and sources therein].
2.2.2 War
In the second stage, warlords fight over a prize of value W . This can be
territory, power, or a resource; it may include the warlords’ own wealth, so
long as this is subject to appropriation during war.
Each warlord receives a share of this prize proportional to his share of
soldiers deployed. Thus warlord 1 receives
[
s1
s1 + s2
]
W (3)
as a direct result of war, where s1 and s2 are the sizes of the armies recruited in
areas 1 and 2, respectively. Warlord 2 receives the remainder of the prize. The
expression in brackets is a standard contest success function [see for example
Tullock (1980), Hirshleifer (1988)]. If s1 = s2 = 0, this fraction is assumed
to be 1/2. Expression (3) represents the traditional approach to appropriative
conflict.
2His acceptance can be secured by offering slightly more than this, but the difference can
be negligibly small.
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2.2.3 Aid
In the final stage, a humanitarian aid agency intervenes. Its aim is to save
as many people as possible from starvation. Food aid is given only to poor
farmers, i.e. not to soldiers and not to farmers with types i > i∗, since these
groups already have enough to survive. A poor farmer who receives aid gets
only what he needs in order to survive, which is c − h(i). The agency is
hampered in its efforts by the fact that a fraction θ of all aid entering an area
is seized by that area’s warlord.3 The agency knows this will happen, so if it
wants an amount x to reach potential famine victims in area j, it must send in
x/(1− θ). The agency has a fixed food budget B which it cannot exceed; nor
is it mandated to provide anyone with more than what they need to survive.
The fact that food aid comes after the hostilities is consistent with the
choices often made by humanitarian agencies in the field, i.e. to withdraw
momentarily from war-torn areas and wait for more peaceful times to do their
job. Several aid agencies chose to withdraw from bloodshed in Sudan’s Dar-
fur, e.g. the Norwegian Refugee Council in November 2006 (IRIN, 2006) and
Oxfam, Mercy Corps and Save the Children Spain in April 2007 (Byers, 2007).
Similar withdrawals took place in Somalia in 1999 (IRIN, 1999).
2.3 Warlords’ payoffs
In making his recruitment decision, a warlord has his eye on the proceeds of
war, given by expression (3), on the wages he must pay his soldiers, and on
the amount of aid which his area can receive, a fraction θ of which falls into
his hands. That is, warlord 1 tries to maximize
pi1 =
[
s1
s1 + s2
]
W − P1 + θA1 , (4)
where P1 is the payroll for his army, and A1 is the total amount of food aid
sent into area 1. Warlord 2 has a similar equation for pi2. We will refer to last
term in the equation as the aid term.
Warlords make their recruitment decisions simultaneously. The agency has
a chance to observe their choices before intervening. We look for the subgame-
perfect equilibrium of this game. In such an equilibrium, the agency acts with
full knowledge of the warlords’ actions; moreover, each warlord acts taking the
3Here θ is exogenous. It could certainly be endogenized, and settle at a level where the
warlord’s efforts to increase it balance out the agency’s efforts to keep it low. We feel this
would add a level of complexity without really generating new results. See Azam (2002) for
a discussion of how warlords allocate effort between warfare and looting.
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other warlord’s actions as given (i.e. correctly anticipating them) and knowing
how the agency will react.
The main tradeoff faced by a warlord is that recruiting poor individuals
into his army may improve matters for him on the battlefield (at relatively low
cost), but at the same time leave fewer people prone to starvation, thereby
resulting in less aid entering his area. In addressing this issue, he must pay
attention not only to how many soldiers he recruits, but also to the types
of individuals he recruits. We will see that warlords’ hiring patterns depend
crucially on the agency’s budget B.
3 Analysis of Equilibrium
Given our assumption of identical areas, all equilibria are symmetric (this is
straightforward to show, but a formal proof is omitted).
Also, all equilibria necessarily involve some recruitment on both sides. If
neither warlord chooses to spend anything on recruitment, i.e. if s1 = s2 = 0,
then each one ends up with half of the prize. But here neither warlord is
taking full advantage of the situation. Since warlord 2 is not putting up a
fight, warlord 1 could take the entire prize by raising even the smallest of
militias: this would be a clear gain. Therefore s1 = s2 = 0 cannot be an
equilibrium.
We will assume that neither warlord ever wants to recruit the entire poor
population in his area. This can be done by placing a suitable restriction on
W . The purpose of this assumption is to ensure a role for food aid in the
model.
3.1 Benchmark: the situation without aid
First of all, for purposes of comparison with subsequent results, let us con-
sider the situation in the absence of any food aid. There is no agency, or,
equivalently, the food aid budget is B = 0.
Under these circumstances, a warlord will hire the cheapest soldiers he can
find: he will recruit only poor people, i.e. people with types i < i∗. Each
of these costs him c, a sort of minimum wage for him. The exact number of
soldiers hired is found by standard optimization techniques. Warlord 1 chooses
s1, anticipating that the other warlord chooses s2. He solves
max
s1
pi1 =
[ s1
s1 + s2
]
W − s1c ; (5)
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warlord 2 chooses s2 simultaneously, taking s1 as given. Taking first-order
conditions, i.e. setting derivatives equal to zero, yields the solution:
s1 = s2 =
W
4c
≡ s¯ . (6)
All poor people not recruited die of starvation; the number of such deaths in
each area is i∗ − s¯. The payroll in each area is s¯c, equal to a quarter of the
value of the prize.
3.2 Effect of food aid
The benchmark equilibrium is an interior solution: each warlord could hire
more or fewer soldiers if he wished, but it is not optimal for him to do so. We
now ask how the introduction of food aid can modify this behavior. We begin
the analysis by making a simple point, in the form of a proposition.
Proposition 1. A warlord’s army never exceeds size s¯ in equilibrium.
We omit a formal proof, since the result is quite intuitive. In the benchmark
equilibrium, each warlord basically maximizes the first two terms on the right-
hand side of (4) when he chooses s¯, since the third term (the aid term) is
not included. What happens if we now include aid terms? Since s¯ already
maximizes the first two terms, the warlord will choose a level other than s¯
only if doing so increases the aid term. How can this happen? Recruiting more
soldiers cannot result in more aid entering an area, since it is non-combatants
who receive aid. But recruiting fewer soldiers may attract more aid to the
area, since those not recruited become potential aid recipients. Therefore we
may consider s¯ as an upper bound on each area’s recruitment in equilibrium.
3.3 Agency strategy
If the agency cannot save everyone from starvation, it will save as many as
it can. The way to do this is not to help the neediest first. If the agency
concentrates its efforts on farmers with types (index numbers) close to 0, it
will not be able to save a large number of people, because then each person
it assists needs to be given a lot of food in order to survive. In other words,
if the agency feeds the neediest first, a little bit of food aid goes only a short
way towards relieving famine.
The agency wants a little bit to go a long way. It will, therefore, give its
top priority to farmers who do need assistance, but who need comparatively
little of it. This means those farmers with types less than but close to i∗.
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This principle is illustrated by Figure 2. In the left panel, individuals with
types from a to i∗ receive aid. Each receives the difference between minimum
survival consumption c and his own production h(i). The red (dark if copy is
black and white) area therefore represents the total amount of aid received by
individuals in the area. In the right panel, the same amount of aid is received
by a different set of individuals, those with types ranging from 0 to b. These
are the neediest people in the area. Clearly, more lives are saved in the left
panel than in the right, and so we retain that strategy as the optimal one for
the agency.
food
i
i*a0 1
c
h(i)
food
i
i*b0 1
c
h(i)
Figure 2. The same amount of aid given to two different parts of the
population. More lives are saved in the left panel than in the right.
Specifically, the agency will feed every farmer (in each area) whose type lies
above a certain threshold a and below i∗. Where this threshold lies depends
on how warlords recruit and on the agency’s budget.
The above reasoning is consistent with alternative interpretations of the
function h(i), which can stand for other things besides food productivity. In
general, h(i) stands for the ease with which food can be obtained. For instance
it could be a function negatively related to one’s distance from food access
centers (FACs) such as cities. Hence someone with a high h(i) would be
someone living close to an FAC, while someone with a low h(i) would be
someone living in a more remote area. Indeed, famines tend to happen in
rural areas, not cities (Cuny, p.7).
This is compounded by the fact that it costs an aid agency more to get
food to its target, the farther the target is from a city or port of entry. And
the longer the delivery route, the more opportunities arise for a warlord to
appropriate a share of the aid, at roadblocks for example. Besides, warlords
often control the transportation infrastructures themselves, renting trucks and
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selling fuel to aid agencies at exorbitant prices. So the farther away an indi-
vidual is from a city, the more needs to be expended in order to save him.
Naturally, under these circumstances, aid agencies will often concentrate on
areas closest to cities first, and gradually expand their operations outward.
This is perfectly consistent with the agency’s strategy given above.
3.4 Equilibrium with small budget
If the agency’s budget is relatively small, then there will not be enough aid
to save everyone in both areas, even if each warlord hires s¯ soldiers. knowing
this, each warlord will try to attract as much of the agency’s budget to his
own area.
Consider what happens if each warlord recruits those individuals in his area
with types immediately below i∗ — the richest of the poor, so to speak. This
is shown in Figure 3. The label r stands for “recruited” and the yellow (lightly
shaded if copy is black and white) areas represent the amount of food paid out
as wages by warlords. When the time comes to distribute aid, the agency sees
the same situation in both areas, and so allocates the aid evenly between the
two. In doing so, it adheres to the principle described above, namely to feed
the most productive poor farmers first. The label a stands for “aided” and the
red area represents the amount of aid received by farmers. This leaves part of
the population, labeled f in the figure, in a state of famine.
food
i
i*0 F A R 1
c
h(i)
Area 1
food
i
i*0 F A R 1
c
h(i)
Area 2
Figure 3. Disequilibrium. Here each warlord could do better by recruit-
ing lower types.
This situation cannot be an equilibrium. Warlords did not act in a forward-
looking manner when recruiting. If warlord 1 anticipates that warlord 2 will
recruit individuals close to i∗ (the richest of the poor) he would do better to
recruit the very poorest soldiers in his area, as shown in Figure 4. The aid
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agency, seeing that the resources at its disposal can save more people in Area 1
than in Area 2, will send more aid to Area 1. The total amount of aid received
is the same as in Figure 3.
food
i
i*0 R F A 1
c
h(i)
Area 1
food
i
i*0 F A R 1
c
h(i)
Area 2
Figure 4. Disequilibrium. Here warlord 1 is recruiting optimally but
warlord 2 is not.
This is not an equilibrium either, since warlord 2’s behavior in this case is
still non-optimal. The true equilibrium is depicted in Figure 5. Both warlords
recruit the poorest individuals in their respective areas, i.e. the ones who
would be the least productive as farmers. In this case neither warlord can
improve his situation given the other’s behavior.
food
i
i*0 R F A 1
c
h(i)
Area 1
food
i
i*0 R F A 1
c
h(i)
Area 2
Figure 5. Equilibrium with small aid budget. Both warlords, because
they are competing for aid, recruit the poorest individuals as soldiers.
In Figure 5 the agency is able to save more lives in total than in either
of the two previous figures, using the same amount of aid. In our model this
happens not because the warlords have any concern for the welfare of their
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populations, but because each is trying to lure the limited amount of aid to
his own area. Each warlord tries to create within his area the conditions which
the aid agency favors for effective intervention.
As for the size of each warlord’s army, this has a lot to do with what we
mean by a small budget for the agency. We showed in Proposition 1 that
in equilibrium warlords do not raise armies larger than s¯. We say that the
agency’s budget is “small” when each warlord recruits s¯ soldiers, hires the
“right” ones (in the sense of Figure 5), and still the agency does not have
enough to save all remaining poor individuals.
As we mentioned when explaining Proposition 1, equilibrium army sizes
will only be less than s¯ if recruiting fewer people can result in more aid. But
if the agency is already expending its entire budget when armies are of size
s¯, then nothing can be done to attract more aid. Therefore armies will be of
size s¯ in equilibrium. The warlord’s tradeoff between army size and aid only
manifests itself with larger agency budgets.
Example 1. Suppose that minimum survival consumption is c = 1 and that
the harvest function is the linear function h(i) = 2i. This yields i∗ = 1/2 as
the breakpoint between rich and poor. Let the value of the prize be W = 1 and
let θ = 1/3 be the fraction of all incoming aid that is looted.
Straightforward calculations show s¯ = 1/4 as the benchmark equilibrium.
When the agency’s budget is small, therefore, each warlord recruits an army
of size 1/4, composed of the lowest-type individuals in his area, which is to say
types 0 to 1/4.
How small is “small”? In each area, types 1/4 to 1/2 are left in want
of assistance. The total aid required to save them, given by triangular areas
such as in the preceding figures, is 1/16 for each area, so 2/16 for both areas
together. Therefore an aid package of 3/16, or 0.1875, is needed to save all
potential famine victims, since a third of it will be looted. Any budget B between
0 and 0.1875, then, results in the equilibrium configuration of Figure 5.
3.5 Equilibrium with large budget
Now we imagine a food aid budget B that is substantially larger. In this
case, since there is plenty of food at the agency’s disposal, warlords no longer
feel the need to compete with each other for it. That is, each warlord feels
confident that whichever poor individuals he does not recruit will receive aid.
So the amount of aid that reaches his area depends on his actions alone, not
on those of the other warlord.
15
Since the agency has not spent its entire budget, each warlord could attract
more aid to his area by recruiting fewer low types. The tradeoff between
soldiers and aid, which was absent when the budget was small, is now present.
Perhaps the best way to represent this tradeoff is to calculate the real cost
of hiring an individual. This is the sum of the labor cost involved (the wage the
individual must be paid) and the opportunity cost of hiring him (the amount
of aid which could have been looted had he not been hired). That is to say,
cost = wage + potential looted aid . (7)
The wage, as mentioned before, is c or h(i), whichever is more. As for aid, an
individual whose type is lower than i∗ will need to receive an amount c− h(i)
to survive. The agency, anticipating that a fraction θ of whatever it sends will
be stolen, sends him
c− h(i)
1− θ
. (8)
A fraction θ of this last amount is stolen, and the rest, c − h(i), reaches the
farmer. An individual whose type is greater than i∗ receives no aid. Equation
(7) becomes
cost(i) =
{
c+
(
θ
1−θ
)
[c− h(i)] if i < i∗ ;
h(i) if i ≥ i∗ .
(9)
According to equation (9), the cost of recruiting an individual is lowest at
i∗ (where it is equal to c) and gets progressively larger as one moves away from
i∗ in either direction. This makes sense. The individual whose type is i∗ can be
paid the minimum wage c and does not receive any aid if left unrecruited: he is
therefore the cheapest to hire. The next cheapest are those to his immediate
left and right. Types slightly below i∗ are also paid c and receive a small
amount of aid if not hired; types slightly above i∗ must be paid a little bit
more than c but receive no aid if not hired.
The optimal strategy for each warlord is of course to hire the cheapest
soldiers in his area, but “cheapest” according to the accounting of equation
(9). The resulting equilibrium is depicted in Figure 6.
We see that in equilibrium the richest of the poor and the poorest of the
rich are recruited: the greater availability of food aid transforms soldiering
from a lower-class to a middle-class occupation.
Of course, removing higher type farmers from food production has poten-
tially important implications on the quantity of food available in the economy.
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Figure 6. Equilibrium with large aid budget. Both warlords, because
they are not competing for aid, leave the lowest types starving so as to
attract as much aid as possible.
The existence of large aid budgets therefore disrupts the optimal allocation of
labor in the recipient regions. This is another manifestation of the Samaritan’s
dilemma in humanitarian aid (Blouin and Pallage, 2009).
As for the size of each army, it is smaller than s¯. Compared with the
small-budget situation, the present situation is one in which soldiers have the
same benefit in battle but cost more on average. So at the same time that
warlords replace low-type soldiers with higher-type ones, they also reduce the
total number of them.
The appendix explains how to determine the precise range of types re-
cruited.
Example 2. Let parameter values be as in Example 1. That is, let c = 1,
h(i) = 2i, W = 1 and θ = 1/3.
Using the method shown in the appendix, we find that each warlord hires
types 0.3545 to 0.5727, an army of size 0.2182.
How large is “large”? In each area types 0 to 0.3545 require assistance to
varying degrees. The amount required to save all these individuals is 0.2288
for each area, so 0.4577 for both areas. An amount 0.6865 has to be sent, since
a third of it will be looted. Therefore a budget B of 0.6865 or more qualifies as
a “large” budget.
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3.6 Equilibrium with medium budget
There is a gap between the largest “small” budget and the smallest “large”
budget, as evidenced by Examples 1 and 2. What happens when the budget
is in this gap?
The resulting equilibrium will share characteristics of the first two scenar-
ios. An equilibrium with starvation is necessarily of the kind pictured in Figure
5, i.e. with small budget. An equilibrium in which the agency does not use
its whole budget is necessarily of the kind seen in Figure 6, i.e. with large
budget. An equilibrium with medium budget, therefore, is one in which the
agency saves everyone, but has no money left over.
As mentioned, the agency will save every poor farmer whose type lies above
a certain threshold a, whose value is determined by the warlords’ recruitment
and by the agency’s own budget.
What is the cost, in equilibrium, of hiring individuals with types i < a?
Their wage is c, since they are necessarily poor. And since their type is too
low for the agency to send them aid, the opportunity cost of hiring them is
zero. As for individuals with types above a, the cost of hiring them is the same
as in the large-budget scenario. In summary, then, the cost of hiring a soldier
of type i is
cost(i) =


c if i < a ;
c+ ( θ
1−θ
)[c− h(i)] if i ∈ [a, i∗) ;
h(i) if i ≥ i∗ .
(10)
The cheapest soldiers to hire are those with types below a, followed by those
with types close to i∗. In equilibrium both warlords hire these, resulting in the
hiring pattern seen in Figure 7.
As the figure shows, warlords recruit from two completely disjoint classes of
people. They hire types close to i∗ for the same reason as in the large-budget
case: because these types are not very good aid-attractors and therefore more
valuable as soldiers. And they hire the lowest types in their areas for the
same reason as in the small-budget case: because the agency’s budget is still
not large enough for them to abandon their competition for aid; they leave
enough high types unrecruited in order to attract the agency’s resources. This
competition diminishes, however, as the aid budget becomes larger. When the
budget is large enough, it disappears completely.
For the same reason as in the large-budget scenario, army size for each
area is strictly less than s¯. The appendix discusses how the exact ranges of
recruited types are determined.
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Figure 7. Equilibrium with medium aid budget. The agency spends its
entire budget (with nothing left over), and no one dies from famine.
Example 3. Let us use the same parameters as in the previous examples:
c = 1, h(i) = 2i, W = 1 and θ = 1/3.
Equilibrium depends critically on the budget B. We let this budget vary
from 0.1875 (the largest “small” budget) and 0.6865 (the smallest “large” bud-
get). For each budget level, we use the method explained in the appendix to find
the equilibrium range of types recruited by the warlords. Results are reported
in Table 1. Each row reports the budget B, three types a, x and y, and army
size s1 (which is equal to s2 in equilibrium). Each warlord recruits types 0 to
a and x to y; the aid agency provides aid to types a to x.
Figure 8 summarizes the results of Examples 1, 2 and 3. The largest small
budget is labeled B∗, and the smallest large budget is B∗∗. For any given
budget, types recruited are those below the a curve plus those between the x
and y curves.
4 Conclusion
We present a simple theory of participation in wars, civil or other. We show
how famines and humanitarian agencies interact with warlords’ choices of
which soldiers to recruit in a civilian population. We assume that civilians
are not drafted. They are hired by warlords and have to be paid a wage at
least equal to their best alternative option in civil life. We show that war-
lords choose their recruits based on their direct cost and on their likelihood
to attract food aid. As a result, depending on the budget available to the
aid agency, warlords may select their troops within a group of more or less
productive farmers.
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B a x y s1
0.1875 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.25
0.2 0.2418 0.4953 0.5024 0.2488
0.25 0.2104 0.4773 0.5113 0.2445
0.3 0.1813 0.4605 0.5197 0.2405
0.35 0.1540 0.4447 0.5276 0.2369
0.4 0.1281 0.4297 0.5351 0.2336
0.45 0.1036 0.4154 0.5423 0.2305
0.5 0.0801 0.4016 0.5492 0.2276
0.55 0.0575 0.3884 0.5558 0.2249
0.6 0.0358 0.3756 0.5622 0.2223
0.65 0.0149 0.3633 0.5684 0.2199
0.6865 0 0.3545 0.5727 0.2182
Table 1. Results for Example 3: equilibrium with medium
aid budget, for various budget levels B. Each warlord hires
types 0 to a and x to y.
We show, as a consequence, that the humanitarian aid agency’s budget
has a potentially important effect on the production of food in the region. If
the aid budget is large, warlords will recruit soldiers within the group of more
productive farmers, even though the latter cost him more to hire. This has a
negative impact on the amount of food produced.
Our paper has two important implications. It provides a new building
block to the micro-foundations of an individual’s participation in conflict, and
possible anticipation and manipulation of those decisions by warlords. It also
provides a tool for aid agencies to forecast how their budget and actions may
effect the intensity of conflict and the faces of those who will starve and those
who will fight.
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Appendix
Equilibrium with large budget
Warlord 1’s payoff is
pi1 =
[
s1
s1 + s2
]
W − P1 + θA1 . (11)
Taking the derivative of pi1 with respect to s1, we obtain
∂pi1
∂s1
=
[
s2
(s1 + s2)2
]
W −
∂P1
∂s1
+ θ
∂A1
∂s1
. (12)
The difficulty here is that P1 and A1 do not merely depend on how many
soldiers are hired, but also on which ones are hired. This is true of their
derivatives also. For this reason, we cannot use (12) in the usual way, i.e.
by setting it equal to zero to find s1. Rather, we use it to measure each
individual’s net marginal value as a soldier. If i is a farmer, this measures the
net increase in pi1 that would result from hiring him. If i is already a soldier, it
measures what would be lost by not hiring him. In equilibrium, all individuals
with positive values are in the army, while those with negative values remain
farmers. When the value is zero, it means the warlord is indifferent between
hiring and not hiring him.
The first term on the right-hand side of (12) is the marginal benefit of
the individual as a soldier, in terms of his help in acquiring the prize. It can
be simplified by noting that in a symmetric equilibrium s2 will be equal to
s1. The last two terms measure the cost of hiring the individual (wage and
opportunity cost), already set out in equation (9). Thus we have
∂pi1
∂s1
=
[
W
4s1
]
− cost(i) , (13)
which is graphed in Figure 9. The warlord hires all types from x to y. Note
that ∂pi1/∂s1 = 0 at both x and y. This is how the values of y and z can
be found. First we let s1 = y − x in equation (13). Then we set the entire
right-hand side of the equation equal to zero, first using i = x (noting that in
this case i < i∗), then again using i = y (noting that this time i > i∗). This
gives us a system of two equations in two unknowns, which is easily solved.
In equilibrium all types from 0 to x need food aid to survive. Since the
warlord behavior described presupposes that the agency can save all of these
individuals, the agency’s budget must be sufficient to do this. This establishes
a lower bound on our notion of a “large” budget.
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Figure 9. Net marginal value of soldiers
when the agency’s budget is large.
Equilibrium with medium budget
The medium-budget equilibrium is solved in a similar way. Equation (13) is
used once again, but this time cost is given by equation (10) instead of (9).
The result is graphed in Figure 10. The warlord hires all types from 0 to a
and from x to y.
-
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Figure 10. Net marginal value of soldiers
in equilibrium when the agency’s budget is
medium.
The values of a, x and y are calculated as follows. First, let s1 = a+ y− x
in equation (13). Then, set the entire right-hand side of the equation equal
to zero, first with i = x then again with i = y (since ∂pi1/∂s1 = 0 at those
points). This gives us two equations in three unknowns: a, x and y. One more
equation is needed. Everyone from a to x needs aid to survive. In the medium-
budget scenario, the agency spends its entire budget and just manages to save
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everyone. Thus for the third equation we calculate the amount of aid which
needs to be sent in order to save types a to x in both areas (taking looting
into account) and set it equal to the agency’s budget B.
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